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I. INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, interjurisdictional issues have
become increasingly important in water allocation, planning and
management. Supplies of water have become tight. Environmental
concerns, often manifested in federal programs, have come to the
fore. Indian tribes have begun to adjudicate and exercise their
reserved rights. Ultimately, water development projects that
traditionally were resolved as a matter of one state's internal
law must now proceed in the context of obligations to other
jurisdictions -- the federal government, other states, Indian
tribes, and sometimes foreign governments. This presentation
treats the constitutional division of power among governments in
the field of water policy by examining federal power, state
authority, tribal prerogatives, and the power of Congress and the
courts to allocate water among jurisdictions.
II. THE NATURE OF FEDERAL POWER
A.	 The Concept of Navigability for Title 
1.	 Development of the Doctrine 
Most nations in the world have given some kind of
special legal treatment to major watercourses
receiving substantial commercial and recreational
use. In the United States, the underlying
rationale of the navigability concept traces to
Roman and English law. Under Roman law, navigable
rivers were a class of watercourses that received
a higher degree of regulation and protection. In
2
England, the Crown held title to the beds and
waters in all navigable rivers, subject to the ius 
publicum. See generally MacGrady, The
Navigability Concept in the Civil and Common Law: 
Historical Development, Current Importance, and 
Some Doctrines that Don't Hold Water, 3 Fla. St.
U.L. Rev. 511 (1975). The United States, mostly
through Supreme Court opinions, then built upon
the Common Law and developed several rules
relating to major watercourses, as discussed
below.
2.	 Geographical Reach of Watercourses Navigable for 
Title 
The English Common Law test of navigability was
whether the water in question was affected by the
ebb and flow of the tide; all inland waters above
the influence of the tide were nonnavigable. See,
e.g., The Steamboat Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 428 (1825). The American test is broader.
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870),
redefined navigable waters as any waters that are
"navigable in fact." The federal test that
defines those watercourses navigable for title
involves three main elements. First, navigability
for title is determined as of the date of
statehood. Second, the waterbody must be
susceptible to navigation for commerce in its
natural and ordinary condition at statehood.
Third, commercial navigation can be any "customary
mode" of trade or travel, and does not require
interstate commerce. See united States v. Holt 
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926); United States v. 
Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); Utah Division of State 
Lands v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2318 (1987);
Phillips Petroleum v. Mississippi, 108 S.Ct. 791
(1988).
3.	 Incidents of the Doctrine
There are three major legal ramifications when a
watercourse meets the legal test for being
navigable for the purposes of title. First,
unless the United States has made a transfer to a
private party or a reservation for a specific
purpose, the state receives by implication title
to the bed of the watercourse up to the mean
highwater mark. See generally Utah Division of 
State Lands v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 2318
(1987). Second, the concept of title navigability
defines the basic reach of the navigation
servitude -- the rule of no compensation that
allows the federal government to affect adversely
private property without payment under the Fifth
Amendment. The servitude extends to projects that
affect watercourses navigable for title and, if
Congress expressly so provides, to nonnavigable
tributaries where there is a reasonable
relationship to navigability. See, e.g., United 
States v. Grand River Dam Authority, 363 u.s. 229
(1960). Third, the traditional public trust
doctrine applies to watercourses navigable for
title. See generally Illinois Central Railroad v. 
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). It should be noted
that the classic federal Illinois Central doctrine
applying to watercourses navigable for title has
been extended in some states as a matter of state
law. Thus, some states have applied public trust
reasoning to navigable watercourses and have
imposed requirements that may not be mandated by
Illinois Central as a matter of federal law, see,
e.g., National Audubon Society v. Superior Court 
of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr.
346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
977 (1983), while other states have extended the
public trust doctrine, as a matter of state law,
to rivers not navigable for title, see, e.g.,
Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. 
Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1984). See
generally Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and 
Western Water Law: Discord or Harmony?, 30 Rocky
Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 17 (1985).
B.	 Federal Regulatory Authority 
1.	 Confusion with the Concept of Navigability for 
Title
In the early cases, the classification of waters
as navigable for title was used as a measure of
the federal government's regulatory authority
under the Commerce Clause. The Court in Gibbons 
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), interpreted
the Commerce Clause as "comprehending navigation
within the limits of every state." Under the
federal commerce power, navigable waters were
described as "the public property of the nation,
and subject to all direct legislation by
Congress." Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3
Wall.) 713, 724-25 (1865). During the twentieth
century, and especially after 1937, the reach of
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause
expanded dramatically. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones 
and Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Unfortunately, widespread confusion developed
between the concept of navigability for title and
Congress's legislative authority, because some
cases had treated the two synonymously, see, e.g.,
Gilman v. Philadelphia, supra, and because several
federal statutes articulated Congress's regulatory
authority in terms of "navigable waters," see,
e.g., United States v. Appalachian Electric Power 
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Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (the "New River" case,
construing the Federal Power Act of 1920).
The Court has now clarified that there is no
correlation between the concept of navigability
for title and the reach of federal power. As
Justice Rehnquist stated in Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), "reference to the
navigability of a waterway adds little if anything
to the breadth of Congress' regulatory power over
interstate commerce:"
It has long been settled that Congress has
extensive authority over this nation's water
under the Commerce Clause. Early in our
history this court held that the power to
regulate commerce necessarily includes power
over navigation . . . . (But] a wide spectrum
of economic activities "affect" interstate
commerce and thus are susceptible of
congressional regulation under the Commerce
Clause irrespective of whether navigation,
or, indeed, water, is involved. The cases
that discuss Congress' paramount authority to
regulate waters used in interstate commerce
are consequently best understood when viewed
in terms of a more traditional Commerce
Clause analysis than by reference to whether
the stream in fact is capable of supporting
navigation or may be characterized as
"navigable water of the United States."
2.	 Extent of Federal Authority
The modern scope of federal regulatory power over
water is nearly unlimited. The leading case
involved section 404 (33 U.S.C.A. S 1344) of the
Clean Water Act. For purposes of obtaining a
permit to discharge dredge and fill material into
navigable waters (defined as "the waters of the
United States," 33 U.S.C.A. S 1362(7)) under
section 404, the Corps of Engineers has defined
navigable waters to include "freshwater wetlands."
Freshwater wetlands are in turn defined by the
Corps as "areas that are inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support . . . a prevalence
of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions. Wetlands generally
include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas."
In United States v. Riverside Bavview Homes, Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985), a private landowner sought to
fill 80 acres of low-lying marshy land. The lower
court held that frequent flooding by adjacent
navigable water was essential to regulation by the
Corps. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld
federal authority, acknowledging the hydrological
connection between wetlands and other bodies of
water for the purposes of combatting water
pollution under the Clean water Act.
3.	 Exercise of Federal Authority
In spite of Congress' broad constitutional power,
federal authority has been exercised quite
sparingly in the area of water. In the area of
water quality, the Army Corps of Engineer's
authority over dredging and filling (now Section
404 of the Clean Water Act) has been on the books
since 1899, but substantial regulatory authority
was not exercised until the last several years.
Section 402 of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C.A.
S 1342), dealing with point source pollution, and
Section 208 (33 U.S.C.A. S 1288), dealing with
nonpoint source pollution, allow for broad
delegation of authority to the states. Congress
has been especially reluctant to legislate in the
area of water quantity, with the exception of
Indian reserved rights. In addition, statutes
such as the Endangered Species Act and the Clean
Water Act have had some impact on water quantity;
notable examples include Riverside Irriaation 
District v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (10th Cir.
1985), and the recent veto process initiated by
EPA under Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act in
regard to Colorado's proposed Two Forks Dam.
C.	 Federal Limitations on Water Transfers 
Federal law affects water marketing in three major
ways. First, the demands of the dormant Commerce
Clause can override the desire of any single state to
ban exports of water. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458
U.S. 941 (1982). Second, Congress has regulated the
transfer of Indian property rights since 1790 and the
current statutory scheme prohibits marketing of Indian
water in most situations. See Getches, Management and 
Marketing of Indian Water: From Conflict to 
Pragmatism, 58 U.Colo. L. Rev. 515 (1988). Third,
congressional statutes relating to federal water
projects may affect withdrawals and transfers of
federal project rights. See generally ETSI Pipeline 
Pro-ject v. Missouri, 108 S.Ct. 805 (1988).
III. THE NATURE OF STATE AUTHORITY
A.	 State Ownership 
Traditionally, state authority in the field of water
law and policy has been described as being based upon
state ownership of all water within a state's
boundaries. Western state constitutions and statutes
thus typically provide that all waters within the state
belong to the state (see, e.g., Wyo. Const. 	 1, Art.
9) or to the public (see, e.g., Ore. Rev. Stat.
537.110). Older cases often use the rationale of state
or public ownership of all waters within the boundaries
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of the state. See, e. g ., State v. Hiber, 48 Wyo. 172,
44 P.2d 1005 (1935). Notions of property ownership,
however, are inadequate to govern the allocation of a
moving resource in a modern interjurisdictional
context. Thus state authority is now best understood
as being based on the exercise of state jurisdiction
under the Tenth Amendment. The Court first debunked
the state ownership doctrine in the related area of
wildlife law, see, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S.
322 (1979). Then, in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S.
941 (1982), the Court rejected the state ownership
doctrine in the context of water law and policy and,
quoting Hughes, stated that state or public ownership
is "but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the
importance to its people that the State have the power
to preserve and regulate the exploitation of an
important resource."
B.	 State Regulatory Authority 
State authority over water may not be based upon
ownership, but it is uncommonly broad. Although
Congress has nearly unlimited authority to preempt
state regulatory authority over water, the
constitutional fact is that state authority can be
expansively exercised under the Tenth Amendment police
power until it is disturbed by Congress. See, e.g.,
California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978)
(holding that section 8 of the 1902 Reclamation Act, 43
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U.S.C.A. SS 372, 383, requires federal compliance with
state water laws, including conditions imposed by state
water agencies in federal permits). As noted, Congress
has acted sparingly in many areas of water law.
The fact that state authority over water is based
on regulatory jurisdiction, rather than ownership,
still leaves room for expansive state authority over
water. Take the example of water diversions under
state law from the federal public lands. In
California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement 
Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935), the Court construed the
Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C.A. S 321, as severing
any water rights that might have accompanied federal
patents on non-navigable waters: "What we hold is that
following the act of 1877, if not before, all non-
navigable waters then a part of the public domain
became publici 'uris, subject to the plenary control of
the designated states . . . ." Two earlier acts, not
limited to non-navigable waters, had also protected
existing water rights as against the United States, Act
of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251, and as against
subsequent patents, Act of July 9, 1870, ch. 235, 	 17,
16 Stat. 218. But these three acts leave numerous
questions open. For example: What law applied on the
public lands before 1877? Or 1870? Or 1866? What law
applies to navigable waterways on the public lands?
What law applies to public lands located in the states
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not subject to the Desert Land Act? The answer on all
counts (assuming that there is no special federal
action, such as a federal reserved water right) is that
state or territorial law, which often incorporated
local customs, has always controlled because state law
was never preempted. The acts of 1866, 1870, and 1877
only confirmed existing law. Thus state courts were
correct from the beginning, see Irwin v. Phillips, 5
Cal. 140 (1855), in applying state water law on the
public lands. See generally Trelease, Uneasy
Federalism -- State Water Laws and National Water Uses,
55 Wash. L. Rev. 751, 758-68 (1980); Wilkinson, Western
Water Law in Transition, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev. 317, 326
n. 38 (1985).
C.	 Limits on State Authority 
In spite of the states' expansive authority to regulate
water, there are significant limitations: states have
obligations to other governments when issuing water
rights. Thus, although such limitations almost never
appear of record in regard to state water rights, state
water rights granted by decree or permit may implicitly
be limited by many other kinds of rights, the most
significant of which are as follows: rights under the
public trust doctrine, in those states where the
doctrine applies to appropriative rights; pueblo water
rights in the Southwest; federal reserved water rights;
Indian reserved water rights; the rights of other
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states; and the rights of foreign nations. It is the
rights of other governments -- federal, state, tribal,
and foreign -- that give rise to the increasingly
extensive body of law involving the interjurisdictional
allocation of water.
IV. AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WATER ALLOCATION AND USE AMONG
JURISDICTIONS
A. Congressional Authority
Congress's supremacy, when exercised, can control
allocation and use. The treaty making authority, both
as to Indian tribes and foreign nations, has led to
important allocations of water. Perhaps the most
sweeping Congressional action -- one not likely to be
repeated -- was the congressional allocation of water
in the Colorado River among the lower basin states
upheld by the Supreme Court in Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546 (1963).
B. State Court General Stream Adjudications 
Of course, the dominant method of allocating water is
the general stream adjudication process employed, in
one form or another, in every western state. Under the
McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C.A. S 666(a), the states
have authority to join the United States, United States 
v. District Court in and for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520
(1971), and Indian tribes, see, e.g., Arizona v. San 
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es'	 Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983), in most
situations.
C.	 Supreme Court Oriainal Jurisdiction 
Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court has original
jurisdiction of "all cases . . . in which a state shall
be a party." Under 28 U.S.C.A. S 1251(a), Supreme
Court jurisdiction of suits between states is made both
original and exclusive. Thus the only judicial remedy
for apportionment of water between or among states is
in the United States Supreme Court.
The Court has developed a prudential rule that it
will not rule on the merits of apportionment cases
unless the plaintiff state can show a substantial
current detriment to its interests. Thus in Kansas v. 
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), the Court dismissed
Kansas's petition and the approach continues today,
see, e.g., Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983). The
policy reasoning behind the rule is that states should
be encouraged to resolve their differences by compact
rather than litigation. When the Court does reach the
merits, it applies the doctrine of equitable
apportionment, as articulated in Nebraska v. Wvomina,
325 U.S. 589 (1945):
So far as possible those established uses should
be protected though strict application of the
priority rule might jeopardize them.
15
Apportionment calls for the exercise for an
informed judgment on a consideration of many
factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding
principle. But physical and climatic conditions,
the consumptive use of water in the several
sections of the river, the character and rate of
return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the
damage to upstream areas as compared to the
benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is
imposed on the former -- these are all relevant
factors.
The Court took up water conservation issues in
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), and
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984), finding
that equitable apportionment requires only those
conservation measures that are "financially and
physically feasible" and "within practicable limits."
See aenerallv Tarlock, The Law of Equitable 
Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 381 (1985). Tarlock lists five
principles that in his view reflect the Court's actual
application of the equitable apportionment doctrine:
1.	 In appropriation states, the doctrine of prior
appropriation will be presumptively applied across
state lines in small river basins.
M
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2. The doctrine of prior appropriation will also be
presumptively applied in large river basins, but
the presumption is weaker on large compared to
small river basins. The Court will be more
willing to temper the doctrine in the name of
equality among states to remove some of the safety
margins it offers to prior users.
3. In riparian states, the common law of riparian
rights will be presumptively applied on both large
and small river basins. As with the doctrine of
prior appropriation, the Court will temper the
common law. However, the Court will seek to
preserve the essential feature of the common law
that riparian states are entitled to a substantial
quantity of the base flow or lake level left in
place to support a wide variety of nonconsumptive
uses.
4. In both prior appropriation and riparian
jurisdictions, the Court retains the power to
displace existing uses but this power will be
exercised sparingly. On small streams, the
inference that can be drawn from Colorado II is
that market reallocations will first be given a
chance to operate. On large streams, the state
that wishes to initiate a new use has the burden
to demonstrate that existing uses are wasteful,
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and the proposed use will promote a more efficient
allocation of the resource.
5.	 State planning to conserve existing supplies will
assume a larger role in state efforts to avoid
sharing duties or to impose sharing duties on
other states.
56 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 410.
D. General Federal and State Court Jurisdiction 
Interstate disputes between or among private parties
are usually within the jurisdiction of federal district
courts and state courts of general jurisdiction. In
such cases the trial courts will borrow from the law of
equitable apportionment and apply it to the private
interstate dispute. See generally Bean v. Morris, 221
U.S. 485 (1911).
E. Interstate Compacts 
Compacts are the preferred method of resolving domestic
interjurisdictional water allocation disputes. The
compact process allows for the kind of flexibility and
innovation that is much more easily achieved through
negotiation rather than litigation. Once approved by
Congress under the Constitution, Article I, Section 10,
Clause 3, they are binding upon the states and all
affected private water users. See generally
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,
304 U.S. 92 (1938); Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554
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(1983). See generally Frankfurter & Landis, The
Compact Clause of the Constitution -- A Study in 
Interstate Adjustments, 34 Yale L.J. 685 (1925); J.
Muys, Interstate Water Compacts: The Interstate 
Compact and Federal-Interstate Compact, National Water
Commis-sion Legal Study No. 14 (1971); C. Myers, A.D.
Tarlock, J. Corbridge, & D. Getches, Water Resource 
Management 987-1007 (1988); J. Sax & R. Abrams, Legal 
Control of Water Resources 736-751 (1986).
V.	 CONCLUSION
The compact process, which combines both state and federal
participation, offers many possibilities for the future.
With the increased importance of water rights held and
administered by tribal governments, it may be that Indian
tribes will be participating in future compact negotiations.
Conceptually, the compact process also suggests the value of
intergovernmental negotiations on a watershed-wide basis
that may result in innovative institutional arrangements
that may be manifested in a federal statute, rather than a
compact. Perhaps the leading example is the creation of the
Northwest Power Planning Council by the Power Planning Act.
See generally Volkman & Lee, Within the Hundredth Meridian: 
Western States and Their River Basins in a Time of 
Transition, 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 551 (1988).
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